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Abstract
The computation of bilinear pairings has been considered the most expensive op-
eration in pairing-based cryptographic protocols. In this paper, we first propose an
efficient and secure outsourcing algorithm for bilinear pairings in the two untrusted
program model. Compared with the state-of-the-art algorithm, a distinguishing
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property of our proposed algorithm is that the (resource-constrained) outsourcer
is not required to perform any expensive operations, such as point multiplications
or exponentiations. Furthermore, we utilize this algorithm as a subroutine to achieve
outsource-secure identity-based encryptions and signatures.
Key words: Cloud computing, Outsource-secure algorithms, Bilinear pairings,
Untrusted program model.
1 Introduction1
With the rapid development in availability of cloud services, the techniques2
for securely outsourcing the prohibitively expensive computations to untrusted3
servers are getting more and more attentions in the scientific community. In the4
outsourcing computation paradigm, the resource-constrained devices can enjoy5
the unlimited computation resources in a pay-per-use manner, which avoids6
large capital outlays in hardware/software deployment and maintenance.7
Despite the tremendous benefits, outsourcing computation also inevitably in-8
troduces some new security concerns and challenges. Firstly, the computation9
tasks often contain some sensitive information that should not be exposed to10
the untrusted cloud servers. Therefore, the first security challenge is the secrecy11
of the outsourcing computation: the cloud servers should not learn anything12
about the data (including the secret inputs and the outputs). We argue that13
the encryption can only provide a partial solution to this problem since it is14
very difficult to perform meaningful computations over the encrypted data.15
Note that fully homomorphic encryption could be a potential solution, but the16
∗ The corresponding author: Xiaofeng Chen (xfchen@xidian.edu.cn)
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existing schemes are impractical. Secondly, the semi-trusted cloud servers may17
return an invalid result. For example, the servers might contain a software bug18
that will fail on a constant number of invocations. Moreover, the servers might19
decrease the amount of the computation due to financial incentives and then20
return a computationally indistinguishable (invalid) result. Therefore, the sec-21
ond security challenge is the checkability of the outsourcing computation: the22
outsourcer should have the ability to detect any failures if the cloud servers23
misbehave. Trivially, the test procedure should never need to perform other24
complicated computations since the computationally limited devices such as25
RFID tags or smartcard may be incapable to accomplish the test. At the very26
least, it must be far more efficient than accomplishing the computation task27
itself (recall the motivation for outsourcing computations).28
In the last decade, the bilinear pairings, especially the Weil pairing and Tate29
pairing of algebraic curves, have initiated some completely new fields in cryp-30
tography, making it possible to realize cryptographic primitives that were pre-31
viously unknown or impractical [11,15,34]. Trivially, implementing the pairing-32
based cryptographic protocols is dependent on the fast computation of pair-33
ings, and thus plenty of research work has been done to implement this work-34
load efficiently [10,13,15,33,36,42].35
The computation of bilinear pairings has been considered the prohibitive ex-36
pensive operation in embedded devices such as the RFID tag or smardcard37
(note that we even assume that the modular exponentiation is too expensive38
to be carried out on such devices). Chevallier-Mames et al. [20] presented the39
first algorithm for secure delegation of elliptic-curve pairings based on an un-40
trusted server model. Besides, the outsourcer could detect any failures with41
probability 1 if the server misbehaves. However, an obvious disadvantage of42
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the algorithm is that the outsourcer should carry out some other expensive op-43
erations such as point multiplications and exponentiations. More precisely, on44
the one hand, we argue that these expensive operations might be too resource45
consuming to be carried out on a computationally limited device. On the other46
hand, the computation of point multiplications is even comparable to that of47
bilinear pairings in some scenarios [25,42] 1 . Therefore, it is meaningless if the48
client must perform point multiplications in order to outsource pairings since49
this contradicts with the aim of outsourcing computation. Therefore, the al-50
gorithm is meaningless for real-world applications in this sense. To the best51
of our knowledge, it seems that all of the following works on delegation of52
bilinear pairings [17,35,44] also suffer from the same problems.53
Our Contribution. In this paper, we propose the first efficient and se-54
cure outsourcing algorithm of bilinear pairings in the one-malicious version55
of two untrusted program model [32]. Compared with the state-of-the-art al-56
gorithm in [20], a distinguishing property of our proposed algorithm is that57
the (resource-constrained) outsourcer never needs to perform any expensive58
operations such as point multiplications and exponentiations. Hence, our pro-59
posed algorithm is very practical. Furthermore, we also utilize this algorithm60
as a subroutine to achieve outsource-secure Boneh-Franklin identity-based en-61
cryptions and Cha-Cheon identity-based signatures.62
1 As pointed out in [25,42], when the supersingular elliptic curve is defined over a
512-bit finite field with embedding degree 2, the computational overhead of a point
multiplication is almost the same as that of a standard Tate pairing.
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1.1 Related Work63
Abadi et al. [2] proved the impossibility of secure outsourcing an exponential64
computation while locally doing only polynomial time work. Therefore, it is65
meaningful only to consider outsourcing expensive polynomial time computa-66
tions. The theoretical computer science community has devoted considerable67
attention to the problem of how to securely outsource different kinds of expen-68
sive computations. Atallah et al. [3] presented a framework for secure outsourc-69
ing of scientific computations such as matrix multiplications and quadrature.70
However, the solution used the disguise technique and thus allowed leakage of71
private information. Atallah and Li [4] investigated the problem of computing72
the edit distance between two sequences and presented an efficient protocol73
to securely outsource sequence comparisons to two servers. Recently, Blan-74
ton et al. proposed a more efficient scheme for secure outsourcing sequence75
comparisons [9]. Blanton and Aliasgari [6,7] proposed an efficient scheme for76
secure outsourcing DNA computations and biometric comparisons. Benjamin77
and Atallah [5] addressed the problem of secure outsourcing for widely appli-78
cable linear algebra computations. However, the proposed protocols required79
the expensive operations of homomorphic encryptions. Atallah and Frikken80
[1] further studied this problem and gave improved protocols based on the81
so-called weak secret hiding assumption. Recently, Wang et al. [45] presented82
efficient mechanisms for secure outsourcing of linear programming computa-83
tions.84
The problem of securely outsourcing expensive computations has been well85
studied in the cryptography community. In 1992, Chaum and Pedersen [21]86
firstly introduced the notion of wallets with observers, a piece of secure hard-87
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ware installed on the client’s computer to perform some expensive computa-88
tions. Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [32] proposed the first outsource-secure89
algorithm for modular exponentiations based on the two previous approaches90
of precomputation [16,41] and server-aided computation [29,39]. Very recently,91
Chen et al. [19] proposed more efficient outsource-secure algorithms for (si-92
multaneously) modular exponentiation in the two untrusted program model.93
Since the servers (or workers) are not trusted by the outsourcers, Golle and94
Mironov [31] first introduced the concept of ringers to solve the trust prob-95
lem of verifying computation completion. The following works focused on the96
other trust problem of retrieving payments [8,23,24,43]. Besides, Gennaro et97
al. [27] first formalized the notion of verifiable computation to solve the prob-98
lem of verifiably outsourcing the computation of an arbitrary functions, which99
has attracted the attention of plenty of researchers [14,28,30,37,38]. Gennaro100
et al. [27] also proposed a protocol that allowed the outsourcer to efficiently101
verify the outputs of the computations with a computationally sound, non-102
interactive proof (instead of interactive ones). Benabbas et al. [12] presented103
the first practical verifiable computation scheme for high degree polynomial104
functions. In 2011, Green et al. [26] proposed new methods for efficiently105
and securely outsourcing decryption of attribute-based encryption (ABE) ci-106
phertexts. Based on this work, Parno et al. [40] showed a construction of a107
multi-function verifiable computation scheme.108
1.2 Organization109
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some background and prelim-110
inaries that will be required throughout this paper are presented in Section111
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2. The security definitions for outsourcing computation are provided in Sec-112
tion 3. The proposed new outsource-secure bilinear pairings algorithm and its113
security analysis are presented in Section 4. The proposed outsource-secure114
identity-based encryptions and signatures are given in Section 5. Finally, Sec-115
tion 6 concludes the paper.116
2 Preliminaries117
In this section, we will briefly describe the basic definition and properties of118
bilinear pairings [11,15,18,25] and then overview the algorithm for delegation119
of pairings [20].120
2.1 Bilinear Pairings121
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic additive groups generated by P1 and P2, respec-122
tively. The order of G1 and G2 is a large prime order q. Define GT to be a123
cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q. A bilinear pairing is a map124
e : G1 ×G2 → GT with the following properties:125
(1) Bilinear: e(aR, bQ) = e(R,Q)ab for all R ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2, and a, b ∈ Z∗q.126
(2) Non-degenerate: There exists R ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2 such that e(R,Q) 6= 1.127
(3) Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(R,Q) for all128
R,Q ∈ G1.129
The examples of such groups can be found in supersingular elliptic curves or130
hyperelliptic curves over finite fields, and the bilinear pairings can be derived131
from the Weil or Tate pairings. For more details, see [11,15,18,25].132
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For the ease of simplicity, we use the above notations throughout this paper.133
2.2 Algorithm for Delegation of Elliptic-Curve Pairings134
The input of Chevallier-Mames et al.’s algorithm [20] is two random points135
A ∈ G1, B ∈ G2, and the output is e(A,B). Assume that the outsourcer T136
has been given the value of e(P1,P2).137
(1) The outsourcer T generates two random elements g1, g2 ∈ Zq, and queries
the following pairings to the server U :
α1 = e(A+ g1P1,P2), α2 = e(P1, B + g2P2), α3 = e(A+ g1P1, B + g2P2).
(2) The outsourcer T verifies that αi ∈ GT , by checking αqi = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3.138
Otherwise, T outputs ⊥ and halts.139
(3) The outsourcer T computes e(A,B) = α−g21 α
−g1
2 α3e(P1,P2)g1g2 .140
(4) The outsourcer T generates four random elements a1, r1, a2, r2 ∈ Zq, and141
queries the following pairing to the server U :142
α4 = e(a1A+ r1P1, a2B + r2P2).





T outputs e(A,B) if and only if α′4 = α4.144
Remark 1. We argue that the outsourcer T should perform some expensive145
operations such as point multiplications and exponentiations. In some cases,146
this contradicts with the motivation of the outsourcing computations.147
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3 Formal Security Definitions148
In this section, we introduce some definitions for secure outsourcing of a cryp-149
tographic algorithm [32].150
Informally, we say that an honest but resources-constrained component T151
securely outsources some expensive work to an untrusted component U , and152
(T, U) is an outsource-secure implementation of a cryptographic algorithm Alg153
if (1) T and U implement Alg, i.e., Alg = TU and (2) suppose that T is given154
oracle access to a malicious U ′ (instead of U) that records all of its computation155
over time and tries to act maliciously, U ′ cannot learn anything interesting156
about the input and output of TU
′
. Besides, another part of the adversary157
A is the adversarial environment E that submits adversatively chosen inputs158
to Alg, i.e., A = (E,U ′). One fundamental assumption is that E and U ′ will159
not have a direct communication channel after they begin interacting with160
T (although E and U ′ may develop a joint strategy beforehand). That is, E161
and U ′ can only communicate with each other by passing messages through162
T . In the real world, a malicious manufacturer E might program its software163
U ′ to behave in an adversarial fashion. However, once U ′ has been installed164
behind the firewall of T , E is no longer able to send instructions to U ′. This165
implies that E may know something about the protected inputs to Alg that166
U ′ does not. For example, E can see all of its own adversarial inputs to Alg,167
while T might hide some of these from U ′. Otherwise, if U ′ could see any168
values chosen by E, then E and U ′ still can agree on a joint strategy that169
causes U ′ to terminate its tasks upon receiving some predefined message from170
E. As a result, no security guarantee can be provided. We illustrate this with171
the proposed outsourcing algorithm [19], if E could capture all of network172
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traffic of T , then E can know which are the test queries (note that T must173
invoke the subroutine Rand and store all the results in its hard disk). As a174
result, U ′ can also know the facts by communicating with E. Consequently,175
when T sends the queries to U ′, U ′ only honestly computes the results for176
the test queries. For the remaining queries, U ′ terminates and just returns a177
random value. Therefore, U ′ can always cheat T without being detected and178
no security guarantees can be obtained.179
The inputs to Alg can be categorized into three logical divisions: (1) Secret:180
information is only available to T (e.g., a secret key or a plaintext) and re-181
mains hidden from E and U ′; (2) Protected: information is only available to182
T and E (e.g., a public key or a ciphertext) while remains hidden from U ′; (3)183
Unprotected: information is available to T , E and U ′ (e.g, the time-stamp).184
similarly, Alg has secret, protected, and unprotected outputs. Moreover, the185
divisions for inputs can be further categorized based on whether the inputs186
are generated honestly or adversarially except the case of adversarial, secret187
inputs (note that E cannot generate secret inputs which are only available to188
T ). Therefore, Alg will take five types of inputs and produce three types of189
outputs.190
The formal definition of an algorithm with outsource-input/output is given as191
follows:192
Definition 1 (Algorithm with outsource-I/O) An algorithm Alg obeys193
the outsource input/output specification if it takes five inputs, and produces194
three outputs. The first three inputs are generated by an honest party, and are195
classified by how much the adversary A = (E,U ′) knows about them, where196
E is the adversarial environment that submits adversarially chosen inputs to197
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Alg, and U ′ is the adversarial software operating in place of oracle U . The first198
input is called the honest, secret input, which is unknown to both E and U ′; the199
second is called the honest, protected input, which may be known by E, but is200
protected from U ′; and the third is called the honest, unprotected input, which201
may be known by both E and U . In addition, there are two adversarially-chosen202
inputs generated by the environment E: the adversarial, protected input, which203
is known to E, but protected from U ′; and the adversarial, unprotected input,204
which may be known by E and U 2 . Similarly, the first output called secret is205
unknown to both E and U ′; the second is protected, which may be known to E,206
but not U ′; and the third is unprotected, which may be known by both parties207
of A.208
The following definition of outsource-security means that if a malicious U ′209
can learn something secret or protected about the inputs to TU from being210
T ’s oracle instead of U , it can also learn without that. That is, there exists a211
simulator S that, when told that TU(x) was invoked, simulates the view of U ′212
without access to the secret or protected inputs of x. Similarly, the definition213
also ensures that the malicious environment E cannot gain any knowledge of214
the secret inputs and outputs of TU , even if T uses the malicious software U ′215
written by E. Also, there exists a simulator S ′ that, when told that TU(x) was216
invoked, can simulate the view of E without access to the secret inputs of x.217
Definition 2 (Outsource-security) Let Alg be an algorithm with outsource218
I/O. A pair of algorithms (T, U) is said to be an outsource-secure implemen-219
2 For any outsource-secure implementation in the real applications, the adversarial,
unprotected input must be empty. Even if it contains a single bit, then a covert
channel may be created from E and U ′. Then, a k bits of shared information can
be obtained after interacting k rounds.
11
tation of Alg if:220
(1) Correctness: TU is a correct implementation of Alg.221
(2) Security: For all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A = (E,U ′),222
there exist probabilistic expected polynomial-time simulators (S1, S2) such223
that the following pairs of random variables are computationally indistin-224
guishable.225
• Pair One. EVIEWreal ∼ EVIEWideal:226
· The view that the the adversarial environment E obtains by par-227
ticipating in the following real process:228
EVIEWireal = {(istatei, xihs, xihp, xihu)← I(1k, istatei−1);229
(estatei, ji, xiap, x
i
au, stop
i)← E(1k,EVIEWi−1real, xihp, xihu);230
























The real process proceeds in rounds. In round i, the honest (secret,235




hu) are picked using an236
honest, stateful process I to which the environment E does not have237
access. Then E, based on its view from the last round, chooses (0)238
the value of its estatei variable as a way of remembering what it did239





hu) to give to T
U ′ (note that E can specify the index ji of241
these inputs, but not their values); (2) the adversarial, protected input242
xiap; (3) the adversarial, unprotected input x
i
au; (4) the Boolean variable243
stopi that determines whether round i is the last round in this process.244
Next, the algorithm TU
′












where tstatei−1 is T ’s previously saved state, and produces a new state246
tstatei for T , as well as the secret yis, protected y
i
p and unprotected y
i
u247
outputs. The oracle U ′ is given its previously saved state, ustatei−1, as248
input, and the current state of U ′ is saved in the variable ustatei. The249
view of the real process in round i consists of estatei, and the values yip250
and yiu. The overall view of E in the real process is just its view in the251
last round (i.e., i for which stopi = TRUE.).252
· The ideal process:253
EVIEWiideal = {(istatei, xihs, xihp, xihu)← I(1k, istatei−1);254
(estatei, ji, xiap, x
i
au, stop
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The ideal process also proceeds in rounds. In the ideal process, we262
have a stateful simulator S1 who, shielded from the secret input x
i
hs, but263
given the non-secret outputs that Alg produces when run all the inputs264
for round i, decides to either output the values (yip, y
i
u) generated by265
Alg, or replace them with some other values (Y ip , Y
i
u). Note that this is266
captured by having the indicator variable repi be a bit that determines267
whether yip will be replaced with Y
i
p . In doing so, it is allowed to query268
oracle U ′; moreover, U ′ saves its state as in the real experiment.269
• Pair Two. UVIEWreal ∼ UVIEWideal:270
· The view that the untrusted software U ′ obtains by participating in271
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the real process described in Pair One. UVIEWreal = (ustate
i, yiu)272
if stopi = TRUE.273
· The ideal process:274
UVIEWiideal = {(istatei, xihs, xihp, xihu)← I(1k, istatei−1);275
(estatei, ji, xiap, x
i
au, stop































In the ideal process, we have a stateful simulator S2 who, equipped281






before, U ′ may maintain state.283
Given an outsource-secure implementation of a cryptographic algorithm Alg =284
TU , we should compare the overhead of T with that for the fastest known285
implementation of Alg. Besides, if the algorithm Alg could not provide 100286
percent checkability, we should evaluate the probability that T could detect287
the misbehavior of U .288
Definition 3 (α-efficient, secure outsourcing) A pair of algorithms (T, U)289
is said to be an α-efficient implementation of Alg if (1) TU is a correct imple-290
mentation of Alg and (2) ∀ inputs x, the running time of T is no more than291
an α-multiplicative factor of the running time of Alg.292
Definition 4 (β-checkable, secure outsourcing) A pair of algorithms293
(T, U) is said to be an β-checkable implementation of Alg if (1) TU is a correct294
implementation of Alg and (2) ∀ inputs x, if U ′ deviates from its advertised295
functionality during the execution of TU
′
(x), T will detect the error with prob-296
14
ability no less than β.297
Definition 5 ((α, β)-outsource-security) A pair of algorithms (T, U) is298
said to be an (α, β)-outsource-secure implementation of Alg if it is both α-299
efficient and β-checkable.300
4 New Outsource-Secure Algorithm of Bilinear Pairings301
4.1 Security Model302
Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [32] first presented the so-called two untrusted303
program model for outsourcing cryptographic computations. In the two un-304
trusted program model, the adversarial environment E writes the code for305
two (potentially different) programs U ′ = (U ′1, U
′
2). E then gives this software306
to T , advertising a functionality that U ′1 and U
′
2 may or may not accurately307
compute, and T installs this software in a manner such that all subsequent308
communication between any two of E, U ′1 and U
′
2 must pass through T . The309
new adversary attacking T is A = (E,U ′1, U ′2). Moreover, we assume that at310
most one of the programs U ′1 and U
′
2 deviates from its advertised functionality311
on a non-negligible fraction of the inputs, while we cannot know which one312
and security means that there is a simulator S for both. This is named as the313
one-malicious version of two untrusted program model (i.e., “one-malicious314
model” for the simplicity) 3 . In the real-world applications, it is equivalent to315
3 Canetti, Riva, and Rothblum [22] introduced the refereed delegation of computa-
tion model, where the outsourcer delegates the computation to several servers under
the assumption that at least one of the servers is honest. Trivially, one-malicious
model can be viewed as a special case of refereed delegation of computation model.
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buy the two copies of the advertised software from two different vendors and316
achieve the security as long as one of them is honest.317
Similar to [32], we also use a subroutine named Rand in order to speed up the318
computations. The inputs for Rand are the groups G1 and G2 with prime319
order q, the bilinear pairing e, and possibly some other (random) values,320
and the outputs for each invocation are a random, independent six-tuple321
(V1, V2, v1V1, v2V1, v2V2, e(v1V1, v2V2)), where v1, v2 ∈R Z∗q, V1 ∈R G1, and322
V2 ∈R G2. A naive approach to implement this functionality is for a trusted323
server to compute a table of random, independent six-tuple in advance and324
then load it into the memory of T . For each invocation of Rand, T just retrieves325
a new six-tuple in the table (the table-lookup method).326
4.2 Outsourcing Algorithm327
In this section, we propose a new secure outsourcing algorithm Pair for bi-328
linear pairings in the one-malicious model. In Pair, T outsources its pairing329
computations to U1 and U2 by invoking the subroutine Rand. A requirement330
for Pair is that the adversary A cannot know any useful information about331
the inputs and outputs of Pair.332
The input of Pair is two random points A ∈ G1, B ∈ G2, and the output333
of Pair is e(A,B). Note that A and B may be secret or (honest/adversarial)334
protected and e(A,B) is always secret or protected. Moreover, both A and335
B are computationally blinded to U1 and U2. We let Ui(Λ1,Λ2) → e(Λ1,Λ2)336
denote that Ui takes as inputs (Λ1,Λ2) and outputs e(Λ1,Λ2), where i = 1, 2.337
The proposed outsourcing algorithm Pair consists of the following steps:338
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(1) To implement this functionality using U1 and U2, T firstly runs Rand339
to create a blinding six-tuple (V1, V2, v1V1, v2V1, v2V2, e(v1V1, v2V2)). We340
denote λ = e(v1V1, v2V2).341
(2) The main trick of Pair is to logically split A and B into random looking342
pieces that can be computed by U1 and U2. Without loss of generality, let343
α1 = e(A+v1V1, B+v2V2), α2 = e(A+V1, v2V2), and α3 = e(v1V1, B+V2).344
Note that345
α1 = e(A,B)e(A, v2V2)e(v1V1, B)e(v1V1, v2V2),
α2 = e(A, v2V2)e(V1, v2V2),
α3 = e(v1V1, B)e(v1V1, V2),







(3) T then runs Rand to obtain two new six-tuple
(X1, X2, x1X1, x2X1, x2X2, e(x1X1, x2X2))
and
(Y1, Y2, y1Y1, y2Y1, y2Y2, e(y1Y1, y2Y2)).
(4) T queries U1 in random order as347
U1(A+ v1V1, B + v2V2)→ e(A+ v1V1, B + v2V2) = α1;348
U1(v1V1 + v2V1, V2)→ e(V1, V2)v1+v2 ;349
U1(x1X1, x2X2)→ e(x1X1, x2X2);350
U1(y1Y1, y2Y2)→ e(y1Y1, y2Y2);351
Similarly, T queries U2 in random order as352
U2(A+ V1, v2V2)→ e(A+ V1, v2V2) = α2;353
U2(v1V1, B + V2)→ e(v1V1, B + V2) = α3;354
U2(x1X1, x2X2)→ e(x1X1, x2X2);355
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U2(y1Y1, y2Y2)→ e(y1Y1, y2Y2);356
(5) Finally, T checks that both U1 and U2 produce the correct outputs, i.e.,357
e(x1X1, x2X2) and e(y1Y1, y2Y2) for the test queries. If not, T outputs358







Remark 2. Given a random point P in G1 (or G2), T can compute the
inverse point −P easily. Therefore, T can query U2(A + V1,−v2V2) → e(A +
V1,−v2V2) = α−12 and U2(−v1V1, B+V2)→ e(−v1V1, B+V2) = α−13 . Similarly,
we can define the outputs of Rand be
(V1, V2, v1V1, v2V1, v2V2, e(v1V1, v2V2)
−1).
Therefore, T needs not to perform the inverse computation in GT .360
4.3 Security Analysis361
Theorem 1 In the one-malicious model, the algorithms (T, (U1, U2)) are an362
outsource-secure implementation of Pair, where the input (A,B) may be hon-363
est, secret; or honest, protected; or adversarial, protected.364
Proof. The proof is similar to [32]. The correctness is trivial and we only365
focus on security. Let A = (E,U ′1, U ′2) be a PPT adversary that interacts with366
a PPT algorithm T in the one-malicious model.367
Firstly, we prove Pair One EVIEWreal ∼ EVIEWideal:368
Note that we only consider three types of input (A,B): honest, secret; or369
honest, protected; or adversarial, protected. If the input (A,B) is anything370
other than honest, secret (this means that the input (A,B) is either honest,371
protected or adversarial, protected. Obviously, neither types of input (A,B)372
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is secret), then the simulation is trivial. That is, the simulator S1 behaves the373
same way as in the real execution. Trivially, S1 never requires to access the374
secret input since neither types of input (A,B) is secret.375
If (A,B) is an honest, secret input, then the simulator S1 behaves as follows:376
On receiving the input on round i, S1 ignores it and instead makes four ran-377




2. S1 randomly tests two378
outputs (i.e., e(Pj, Qj)) from each program. If an error is detected, S1 saves379
all states and outputs Y ip=“error”, Y
i
u=∅, repi=1 (i.e., the output for ideal380
process is (estatei, “error”,∅)). If no error is detected, S1 checks the remain-381
ing two outputs. If all checks pass, S1 outputs Y
i
p=∅, Y iu=∅, repi=0 (i.e., the382
output for ideal process is (estatei, yip, y
i
u)); otherwise, S1 selects a random el-383
ement r and outputs Y ip=r, Y
i
u=∅, repi=1 (i.e., the output for ideal process384
is (estatei, r,∅)). In either case, S1 saves the appropriate states.385
The input distributions to (U ′1, U
′
2) in the real and ideal experiments are com-386
putationally indistinguishable. In the ideal experiment, the inputs are chosen387
uniformly at random. In the real experiment, each part of all queries that388
T makes to any one program in the step (4) of Pair is independently re-389
randomized and the re-randomization factors are also truly randomly gener-390
ated by using naive table-lookup method 4 . We consider the following three391
possible cases:392
Firstly, if (U ′1, U
′
2) behave honest in the round i, then EVIEW
i
real ∼ EVIEWiideal393




2) perfectly executes Pair in the real experiment and394
4 We argue that if v1, v2, V1, and V2 are random elements in Z∗q , Z∗q , G1, and
G2, respectively, then the output of Rand is also a random, independent six-tuple
(V1, V2, v1V1, v2V1, v2V2, e(v1V1, v2V2)).
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S1 simulates with the same outputs in the ideal experiment, i.e., rep
i=0).395
Secondly, if one of (U ′1, U
′
2) is dishonest in the round i and it has been detected396
by both T and S1 (with probability
1
2
), then it will result in an output of397
“error”. Finally, we consider the case that the output of Pair is corrupted,398
i.e., one of (U ′1, U
′
2) is dishonest in the round i while it is undetected (with399
probability 1
2
) by T . In the real experiment, the four outputs generated by400
(U ′1, U
′
2) are multiplied together along with a random value λ
−1 (see the step401
(5) of our algorithm Pair). Thus, the output of Pair looks random to the402
environment E. In the ideal experiment, S1 also simulates with a random403
value r ∈ GT as the output. Thus, EVIEWireal ∼ EVIEWiideal even when one404
of (U ′1, U
′
2) is dishonest. By the hybrid argument, we conclude that EVIEWreal405
∼ EVIEWideal.406
Secondly, we prove Pair Two UVIEWreal ∼ UVIEWideal:407
The simulator S2 always behaves as follows: On receiving the input on round408
i, S2 ignores it and instead makes four random queries of the form (Pj, Qj) to409
both U ′1 and U
′




2). E can easily410
distinguish between these real and ideal experiments (note that the output in411
the ideal experiment is never corrupted). However, E cannot communicate this412
information to (U ′1, U
′
2). This is because in the round i of the real experiment, T413
always re-randomizes its inputs to (U ′1, U
′
2). In the ideal experiment, S2 always414
generates random, independent queries for (U ′1, U
′
2). Thus, for each round i we415
have UVIEWireal ∼ UVIEWiideal. By the hybrid argument, we conclude that416
UVIEWreal ∼ UVIEWideal.417





)-outsource-secure implementation of Pair, where n is the bit length419
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of the order q of bilinear groups.420
Proof. The proposed algorithm Pair makes 3 calls to Rand plus 5 point421
addition in G1 (or G2), and 4 multiplication in GT in order to compute e(A,B).422
Also, the computation for Rand is negligible when using the table-lookup423
method. On the other hand, it takes roughly O(n) multiplications in resulting424
finite filed to compute the bilinear pairing 5 . Thus, the algorithms (T, (U1, U2))425
are an O( 1
n
)-efficient implementation of Pair.426
On the other hand, U1 (resp. U2) cannot distinguish the two test queries from427
the two real queries that T makes. If U1 (resp. U2) fails during any execution428




We compare the proposed algorithm with the algorithm in [20]. We denote431
by PA a point addition in G1 (or G2), by SM a point multiplication in G1432
(or G2), by M a multiplication in GT , by Inv an inverse in GT , by Exp an433
exponentiation in GT , and P a computation of the bilinear pairing. We omit434
5 The computation of bilinear pairings is closely related to the security parameters
(that determines the security levels), the kinds of curves (supersingular curves,
ordinary curves, or hyperelliptic curves), the kinds of bilinear pairings (the Weil
pairing, the Tate pairing, or the Eta pairing), the finite field (the characteristic
is 2, 3 or p) and embedding degree etc. Koblitz and Menezes [36] presented some
examples of the pairings evaluation under the various parameters. For example, it
takes roughly 22n multiplications in finite filed GF(p) to compute the Tate pairing
e(A,B) when E is a supersingular elliptic curve defined over GF(p) with embedding
degree k = 2, where p is a 512-bit prime in order to achieve 80-bit security level.
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other operations such as modular additions in Zq.435
Table 1. Comparison of the two algorithms
Algorithm [20] Algorithm Pair
T 10 Exp + 2 Inv + 6 SM + 4 PA + 6 M 5 PA + 4 M
U 4 P (U) 4 P (U1) + 4 P (U2)
Table 1 presents the comparison of the efficiency between algorithm [20] and436
our proposed algorithm Pair. Compared with the algorithm [20], the proposed437
algorithm Pair is much superior in efficiency. More precisely, the outsourcer438
T does not require the prohibitively expensive operations SM and Exp in our439
algorithm Pair (note that a computationally limited device may be incapable440
to perform such operations at all). Moreover, the computation of SM (or Exp)441
is comparable to that of a pairing in some cases, and this will violate the442
motivation of the outsourcing computations.443
On the other hand, it takes the servers U to perform 8P in our algorithm444
Pair (4P for each server Ui). Besides, the computation for Rand is about445
3P + 3Exp + 9SM, while it is negligible due to the table-lookup method.446
Therefore, the proposed algorithm Pair requires more computation load in447
the server side compared with [20]. However, note that the server is much448
more computationally powerful, and thus the efficiency of our algorithm will449
not be affected in this sense.450
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5 Secure Outsourcing Algorithms for Identity-based Encryptions451
and Signatures452
In this section, we utilize the proposed subroutine Pair to give two secure453
outsourcing algorithms for Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryption scheme454
[11] and Cha-Cheon identity-based signature scheme [18], where a special case455
of bilinear pairing e : G1 ×G1 → GT is used (i.e., G1 = G2).456
Note that the outsourcer T is assumed to be a computationally limited de-457
vice that cannot carry out the prohibitively expensive computations such as458
bilinear pairings, point multiplications, modular exponentiations, and so on,459
thus the proposed two algorithms requires an additional subroutine SM [19]460
for outsourcing the computations of point multiplications in G1.461
5.1 Outsource-secure Boneh-Franklin Identity-based Encryptions462
The proposed outsource-secure Boneh-Franklin encryption scheme consists of463
the following efficient algorithms:464
• Setup: Chooses a random s ∈ Z∗q and sets Ppub = sP . Define four cryp-
tographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1, H2 : GT → {0, 1}n for some
n, H3 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → Z∗q and H4 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. The public
parameters of the system are
params = {G1,GT , e, q, P, Ppub, H1, H2, H3, H4}.
The master key is s.465
• Extract: On input an identity ID, run the extract algorithm to obtain the466
secret key SID = sH1(ID).467
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• Encryption: On input the public key ID and a message m ∈ {0, 1}n, the468
outsourcer T runs the subroutine Pair and SM to generate the ciphertext469
C as follows:470
(1) T chooses a random σ ∈ {0, 1}n and computes r = H3(σ,m).471
(2) T runs SM to obtain C1 = rP and R = rH1(ID).472
(3) T runs Pair to obtain Pair(R,Ppub)→ ϕ.473
(4) T computes C2 = σ ⊕H2(ϕ) and C3 = m⊕H4(σ).474
(5) T outputs the ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3).475
• Decryption: On input the secret key SID, and the ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3),476
the outsourcer T ′ runs the subroutine Pair and SM to compute the message477
m as follows:478
(1) T ′ runs Pair to obtain Pair(SID, C1)→ ϕ.479
(2) T ′ computes σ = C2 ⊕H2(ϕ).480
(3) T ′ computes m = C3 ⊕H4(σ).481
(4) T ′ computes r = H3(σ,m) and then runs SM to obtain rP .482
(5) T ′ outputs m if and only if C1 = rP .483
Remark 3. Note that the outsourcer only needs to perform 6 hash and 4484
bitwise operations (instead of 2 pairings and 3 point multiplications) in the485
above encryption scheme.486
5.2 Outsource-secure Cha-Cheon Identity-based Signatures487
The proposed outsource-secure Cha-Cheon signature scheme consists of the488
following efficient algorithms:489
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• Setup: Chooses a random s ∈ Z∗q and sets Ppub = sP . Define two crypto-490
graphic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗×G1 → Zq, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1. The pub-491
lic parameters of the system are params = {G1,GT , e, q, P, Ppub, H1, H2}.492
The master key is s.493
• Extract: On input an identity ID, run the extract algorithm to obtain the494
signing key SID = sH2(ID).495
• Sign: On input the singing key SID and a message m, the outsourcer T496
runs the subroutine SM to generate the signature σ as follows:497
(1) T chooses a random r ∈ Z∗q and runs SM to obtain U = rH2(ID).498
(2) T computes h = H1(m,U).499
(3) T runs SM to obtain V = (r + h)SID. The signature is σ = (U, V ).500
• Verify: On input the verification key ID, the message m, and the signature501
σ = (U, V ), the outsourcer T ′ runs the subroutine Pair and SM to verify502
the signature σ as follows:503
(1) T ′ computes h = H1(m,U).504
(2) T ′ runs SM to obtain hH2(ID) and computes T = U + hH2(ID).505
(3) T ′ runs Pair to obtain Pair(P, V )→ β1 and Pair(Ppub, T )→ β2.506
(4) T ′ outputs 1 if and only if β1 = β2.507
Remark 4. Note that the outsourcer only needs to perform 2 hash and 1508
point addition operations (instead of 2 pairings and 3 point multiplications)509
in the above signature scheme.510
6 Conclusions511
In this paper, we first proposed an efficient and secure outsourcing algorithm512
for bilinear pairings in the two untrusted program model. A distinguishing513
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property of our proposed algorithm is that the (resources-limited) outsourcer514
never requires to accomplish some expensive operations such as point multi-515
plications and exponentiations.516
The security model of our outsourcing algorithm requires the outsourcer to517
interact with two untrusted while non-colluding cloud servers (the same as518
[32]). Therefore, an interesting open problem is whether there is an efficient519
algorithm for securely outsourcing bilinear pairings using only one untrusted520
cloud server.521
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[13] Barreto P., Galbraith S., Ó’ hÉigeartaigh C., Scott M.: Efficient565
pairing computation on supersingular Abelian varieties. Designs, Codes and566
Cryptography, 42(3), 239-271 (2007).567
[14] Blum M., Luby M., Rubinfeld R.: Self-testing/correcting with applications to568
numerical problems. Journal of Computer and System Science, 47(3), 549-595569
(1993).570
[15] Boneh D., Lynn B., Shacham H.: Short signatures from the Weil pairings.571
Advances in Cryptology-Asiacrypt 2001. LNCS 2248, pp. 514-532 (2001).572
[16] Boyko V., Peinado M., Venkatesan R.: Speeding up discrete log and factoring573
based schemes via precomputations. Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypt 1998.574
LNCS 1403, pp.221-232 (1998).575
[17] Chow S., Au M., Susilo W.: Server-aided signatures verification secure against576
collusion attack. Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information,577
Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS). pp. 401-405 (2011).578
[18] Cha J., Cheon J.H.: An identity-based signature from gap Diffie-Hellman579
groups. Public Key Cryptography-PKC 2003. LNCS 2567, pp. 18-30 (2003).580
[19] Chen X., Li J., Ma J., Tang Q., Lou W.: New algorithms for secure outsourcing581
of modular exponentiations. ESORICS 2012. LNCS 7459, pp. 541-556 (2012).582
[20] Chevallier-Mames B., Coron J., McCullagh N., Naccache D., Scott M.: Secure583
delegation of elliptic-curve pairing. CARDIS 2010. LNCS 6035, pp. 24-35 (2010).584
[21] Chaum D., Pedersen T.: Wallet databases with observers. Advances in585
Cryptology-Crypto 1992. LNCS 740, pp. 89-105 (1993).586
28
[22] Canetti R., Riva B., Rothblum G.: Practical delegation of computation using587
multiple servers. Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer and588
Communications Security (CCS). pp. 445-454 (2011).589
[23] Carbunar B., Tripunitara M.: Conditioal payments for computing markets.590
CANS 2008. LNCS 5339, pp. 317-331 (2008).591
[24] Carbunar B., Tripunitara M.: Fair payments for outsourced computations.592
SECON 2010. pp. 529-537 (2010).593
[25] Galbraith S., Paterson K., Smart N.: Pairings for cryptographers. Discrete594
Applied Mathematics, 156(16), 3113-3121 (2008).595
[26] Green M., Hohenberger S., Waters B.: Outsourcing the decryption of ABE596
ciphertexts. Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security. The597
full version can be found at http://static.usenix.org/events/sec11/tech/full-598
papers/Green.pdf (2011).599
[27] Gennaro R., Gentry C., Parno B.: Non-interactive verifiable computing:600
Outsourcing computation to untrusted workers. Advances in Cryptology-Crypto601
2010. LNCS 6223, pp. 465-482 (2010).602
[28] Goldwasser S., Kalai Y.T., Rothblum G.N.: Delegating computation: interactive603
proofs for muggles. Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on the Theory of604
Computing (STOC). pp. 113-122 (2008).605
[29] Girault M., Lefranc D.: Server-aided verification: theory and practice. Advances606
in Cryptology-ASIACRYPT 2005. LNCS 3788, pp. 605-623 (2005).607
[30] Goldwasser S., Micali S., Rackoff C.: The knowledge complexity of interactive608
proof-systems. SIAM Journal on Computing, 18(1), 186-208 (1989).609
[31] Golle P., Mironov I.: Uncheatable distributed computations. CT-RSA 2001.610
LNCS 2020, pp. 425-440 (2001).611
29
[32] Hohenberger S., Lysyanskaya A.: How to securely outsource cryptographic612
computations. TCC 2005. LNCS 3378, pp. 264-282. The full version can be found613
at http://www.cs.jhu.edu/ susan/papers/HL05.pdf (2005).614
[33] Hess F., Smart N., Vercauteren F.: The Eta pairing revisited. IEEE Transactions615
on Information Theory, 52(10), 4595-4602 (2006).616
[34] Joux A.: A one round protocol for tripartite Diffie-Hellman. Algorithmic617
Number Theory Symposium-ANTS IV. LNCS 1838, pp. 385-394 (2000).618
[35] Kang B., Lee M., Park J.: Efficient Delegation of pairing computation.619
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/259 (2005).620
[36] Koblitz N., Menezes A.: Pairing-based cryptography at high security levels.621
Cryptography and Coding 2005. LNCS 3796, pp. 13-36 (2005).622
[37] Kilian J.: Improved efficient arguments (preliminary version). Advances in623
Cryptology-Crypto 1995. pp. 311-324. (1995).624
[38] Micali S.: CS proofs. Proceedings of the 35th Annual Symposium on625
Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS). pp. 436-453 (1994).626
[39] Matsumoto T., Kato K., Imai H.: Speeding up secret computations with627
insecure auxiliary devices. Advances in Cryptology-Crypto 1988. LNCS 403, pp.628
497-506, (1988).629
[40] Parno B., Raykova M., Vaikuntanathan V.: How to delegate and verify in public:630
verifiable computation from attribute-based encryption. TCC 2012. LNCS 7194,631
pp. 422-439 (2012).632
[41] Schnorr C.P.: Efficient signature generation for smart cards. Journal of633
Cryptology, 4(3), 239-252 (1991).634
[42] Scott M., Costigan N., Abdulwahab W.: Implementing cryptographic pairings635
on smartcards. CHES 2006. LNCS 4249, pp. 134-147 (2006).636
30
[43] Shi L., Carbunar B., Sion R.: Conditional E-cash. FC 2007. LNCS 4886, pp.637
15-28 (2007).638
[44] Tsang P., Chow S., Smith S.: Batch pairing delegation. IWSEC, pp. 74-90639
(2007).640
[45] Wang C., Ren K., Wang J.: Secure and practical outsourcing of linear641
programming in cloud computing. Proceedings of the 30th IEEE International642
Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM). pp. 820-828, (2011).643
31
